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Abstract In this paper we approach financial investors to see how they analyze financial 
markets, adopt their investment decisions, and buy financial products. Our main goal is to 
ascertain whether or not the investment guidelines provided by the most accepted normative 
theories in Finance are carried out in practice by investors. In order to do that, we review the 
main financial theories, either normative or descriptive, and we then provide empirical evidence 
of the investors’ behaviour. Findings show that investors often disobey the recommendations 
offered by normative theories in Finance.
© 2012 Asociación Cuadernos de Economía. Published by Elsevier España, S.L. All rights reserved.
¿Son realistas los modelos financieros de carácter normativo?
Resumen En este artículo abordamos cómo los agentes que adquieren productos financieros 
toman sus decisiones de inversión. El objetivo es averiguar si las pautas de actuación emanadas 
de las modernas teorías de Finanzas se reproducen o no en la práctica. Para ello ofrecemos una 
panorámica de las principales teorías financieras de tipo normativo y descriptivo, así como 
evidencia empírica del comportamiento de los inversores. La conclusión es que el compor-
tamiento de los inversores suele discrepar a menudo de las indicaciones ofrecidas por las teorías 
financieras de carácter normativo.
© 2012 Asociación Cuadernos de Economía. Publicado por Elsevier España, S.L. Todos los derechos 
reservados.
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1. Introduction
An essential taxonomy in Finance − and, generally speaking, 
in all social sciences − is the one that divides financial 
knowledge into normative and descriptive (a.k.a. positive) 
theories. This way, normative theories attempt to set rules 
about the optimal behaviour of the individual decision 
maker (‘how should a rational agent behave’). Descriptive 
theories, instead, do not give recommendations about 
what an optimal behaviour would be, but they are bound to 
identify how economic agents actually behave under specific 
circumstances. Consequently, it would be of great interest to 
test the empirical validity of normative theories, i.e. finding 
out whether or not the theoretical models that are most 
accepted and used in the financial industry are realistic.
We claim a model to be realistic if it has the reasonable 
potential to explain and predict the behaviour of agents 
and/or variables under analysis. This is of vital importance 
in financial economics − as well as many other fields − not 
only from an academic point of view, but for practical 
purposes, given its implications in people’s lives and society 
at large. In particular, when we deal with financial models 
and its empirical validity regarding investors’ behaviour, 
three questions become essential. First, how do investors 
make their financial decisions? Second, do these decisions 
reproduce the guidelines and recommendations that 
modern theories of Finance provide about financial markets, 
or do they exhibit some kind of bias? Third, and in case 
they exhibit some bias, could we find similarities across 
investors? Our main goal in this paper will be to answer 
these and similar questions in order to clarify whether 
investors’ behaviour has a solid background on the main 
theories of Finance in the last fifty years.
In order to fulfil this goal, we will focus on two aspects. 
On one hand, we shall analyze the most relevant normative 
theories on financial markets and investments, paying 
special attention to the so‑called Efficient Market Hypothesis 
(EMH) as the analytical starting point.1 It is indeed rather 
easy for investors to get lost among the many investment 
rules and strategies that promise an attractive return at a 
low risk. However, we must never forget what EMH suggests 
about how financial markets work: no investor can make 
above‑market returns systematically − a conclusion that 
would severely limit the optimal strategies available to 
investors. 
On the other hand, and opposed to those normative 
theories, we shall ask ourselves how investors make their 
financial decisions in practice. Are they really convinced 
that beating the market is ‘mission: impossible’? Or do they 
believe that their financial advisors, who are more prepared 
and informed than themselves, could make it for them 
instead? Furthermore, do they really believe that their 
crucial investment goal must be beating the market? Or 
are they (more) aware that a more suitable strategy would 
be to investing their savings according to their financial 
objectives and constraints, framed by the stage of the 
‘investor life cycle’ they are at? Answering these and other 
related questions will be determinant in understanding how 
1. This hypothesis was stated by Eugene Fama in his famous 
article of 1970 (Fama, 1970).
investors make their financial decisions and whether they 
agree with what normative models predict.
The bulk of this article sets its background on Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979), the foundational paper on behaviourist 
literature − Prospect Theory − in which we base our 
empirical research to illustrate people’s behaviour towards 
risk; and Hens and Bachmann (2008) who, in their book 
‘Behavioral finance for private banking’, explain how to 
provide consultancy services taking into account not only 
how financial markets work according to the most accepted 
normative theories in finance, but also how private clients 
make their decisions and evaluate the results of their 
investments according to Prospect Theory.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In 
section 2, we briefly review some of the most relevant 
theories about the functioning of financial markets and the 
investment rules that follow from them. In section 3, we 
describe how investors make their financial decisions in 
practice, differentiating between active investors (those that 
make their own investment decisions) and passive investors 
(those that hire professional services). We then provide 
empirical evidence on how people face risk and whether they 
are aware of the consequences. In section 4, we examine 
some features that most investors were found to share when 
we analyzed their portfolios. Finally, in section 5, we highlight 
the disparity between what normative models in Finance 
predict and what investors do in practice. Section 6 concludes.
2. A brief review of the most relevant theories 
about financial markets and investments
An exhaustive description of the many theories about how 
financial markets work as well as the investment strategies 
available to investors — according to the academic 
literature and the financial industry — is beyond the scope 
of this paper (according to the academic literature and the 
financial industry). Notwithstanding, in this section we shall 
provide a brief description of the most relevant theories 
with the purpose of comparing them with the actual 
behaviour of investors and determining whether or not the 
practice is aligned with the theory.
To understand how financial markets work, we need to take 
into account three basic foundations of traditional Finance: 
the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), the Modern Portfolio 
Theory (MPT) and asset pricing models like the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM) and similar ones, and the pricing of 
financial derivatives. Though the jargon may be confusing, 
an efficient market is not necessarily perfect nor infallible2; 
contrarily, EMH actually lays on the concept of informational 
efficiency of financial markets (Blake, 2000). In detail, we 
say that a market is efficient when prices fully reflect all 
information available at any moment (Fama, 1970), regarding 
events that have already happened, as well as events that, 
2. A perfect market requires costless information, no transaction 
costs, no taxes, perfect competition... An infallible market should 
be able to ‘prophesize’ the future, knowing in advance what is not 
known yet by market participants. Obviously, financial markets do 
not fulfil those definitions, but neither of them is required to be 
efficient.
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given information available, the market expects to happen in 
the future and, hence, anticipates (Fama, 1965). Alternatively, 
Richard Roll tried to make it simpler by saying that the EMH 
asserts that ‘there is no free lunch’, particularly in financial 
markets.3 Following this, Statman (1999) interestingly 
highlights that the term ‘efficiency’, (which) when applied to 
financial markets, has actually two meanings: that investors 
cannot systematically beat the market; and that security 
prices are rational, meaning they reflect only fundamental 
characteristics (risk and expected return), but not subjective 
characteristics such as emotional or heuristic biases.
A second pillar of traditional Finance lies on MPT and asset 
pricing models, such as CAPM and similar. While all of them 
are simplified depictions of financial markets, they have the 
virtue of providing two essential interpretations about them. 
On one hand, MPT4 highlights the benefits of diversification, 
as well as the trade-off relationship that exists between 
risk and return: investors must be aware that looking for a 
higher return on their savings imperatively requires exposing 
themselves to a higher market risk (a.k.a. systematic or 
un‑diversifiable risk). On the other hand, asset pricing models 
accordingly take into account either that the required return 
of an asset depends exclusively on that systematic risk (as 
in CAPM5), or that under an efficient market in equilibrium 
arbitrage opportunities6 should not exist (like APT7 predicts).
Finally, the absence of arbitrage opportunities is also 
key in the third foundation of traditional Finance, i.e. the 
pricing of financial derivatives. The fundamental theorem of 
arbitrage links an arbitrage-free market in equilibrium with 
a risk-neutral valuation by market participants. Applied to 
option derivatives, a classic result of this theorem is the 
famous pricing equation for European options by Black and 
Scholes (1973).8
The three above are the basic foundations of traditional 
Finance that explain how financial markets work. However, 
which strategies and investment rules are provided to 
investors by the academic literature and the financial 
industry? Firstly, it should be pointed out that, if EMH holds, 
there would be a strong limit on investors’ ability to obtain 
higher risk-weighted returns than the market average. 
Furthermore, even theories opposed to EMH (like the 
Behavioural Finance Theory) assert as well that investors will 
(also) be unable to systematically beat an inefficient market.9
3. Roll’s foreword to Lo (1997).
4. For which Harry Markowitz (1952) represents the starting point.
5. See the classic paper by William Sharpe (1964).
6. Where arbitrage means buying undervalued securities, financed 
with the simultaneous sale of overpriced securities, this way ear-
ning a riskless profit with no additional capital resources required 
(Sharpe & Alexander, 1990).
7. Arbitrage Pricing Theory.
8. The paper by Black and Scholes (1973) was later extended by 
Robert Merton (1973), who named this equation the ‘Black-Scholes 
equation’ for the first time.
9. Shefrin (2000), for example, warns that even though agents’ 
behavioural biases generate investment opportunities, they also in-
troduce an additional source of risk beyond fundamental risk. Besi-
des, limits of arbitrage introduced by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
would imply, according to Barberis and Thaler (2003), that the two 
interpretations of market efficiency, i.e. that prices fully reflect 
information available and that investors cannot systematically beat 
the market, are no longer equivalent, because the latter interpre-
tation would also hold in an inefficient market.
Indeed, investment recommendations like those suggested 
by Siegel (1998) are in favour of a ‘buy-and-hold strategy’ 
as the one that, in view of the successful track record of 
equities markets during the last two centuries,10 provides 
the highest return expectations to investors. Other 
recommendations, like investing in index funds, most 
Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs)11 and similar strategies, 
follow the assumption that markets are efficient and hence 
not even the best informed highly-skilled fund manager 
will be able to systematically beat them. On the other 
hand, (the) investment strategies based on technical and 
fundamental analysis, among other (financial) theories, 
attempt to make a profit out of the possible inefficiencies of 
markets to obtain higher returns.
In any case, no matter whether financial markets are 
indeed efficient or not, from the investors’ point of view 
it is essential to set investment guidelines that are in 
accordance with their risk profile, life horizon, (their) 
objectives and constraints. In fact, the ‘investor life cycle’ 
model12 — a classic in the financial industry when advising 
to customers — prescribes that a suitable analysis of an 
individual investment framework must take into account 
the investment goals as well as the financial constraints, 
both often influenced by the stage of the investor life cycle 
is at (determined by their age, present and future income, 
living standards, financial needs...). As a final result, 
customers should design their investment strategy in three 
steps: first, which asset classes are to be included and in 
which proportion (asset allocation); then, which individual 
assets are to be included in the portfolio (asset choice); and 
finally, deciding when to buy or sell each of those securities 
(market timing).13
3. Investors’ behaviour in practice
Once the main normative theories of financial markets and 
investing have been surveyed, we shall ascertain whether 
investors follow those rules in practice or not. In order to 
answer this question we distinguish between individual 
investors, who make their investments motu proprio, 
and investors that manage their savings through expert 
intermediation (fund managers, financial advisors, private 
banking...).
3.1. Amateur investors and financial consultancy
What do individual or amateur investors pay attention to? 
Perhaps the best answer to this question was provided 
10. Mehra and Prescott (1985) highlighted the ‘equity premium’ 
obtained by the S&P 500 index from 1889 to 1978. During that pe-
riod equities obtained a 7% average return, whereas short-term 
debt only yielded 1%.
11. Most ETFs are indeed index funds.
12. For detailed information about the validity of investor life cy-
cle models and whether they fit with other classic theories like MPT, 
see Antelo and Peón (2011).
13. Not only is the first stage (asset allocation) the more impor-
tant of the three because of the risk diversification obtained when 
combining assets of different nature, but it is also a basic founda-
tion of MPT (Antelo & Peón, 2011).
92 D. Peón, M. Antelo
by Robert Shiller (1984) when he asserted that investing 
in speculative assets is a ‘social activity’. Consequently, 
most investors that make their own investment decisions 
“spend a substantial part of their leisure time discussing 
investments, reading about investments, or gossiping about 
others’ successes or failures in investing” (p. 457).
This way, the role of mass media in provoking attention 
cascades becomes determinant. The first only‑news TV 
station (CNN in 1980) was followed by those specialized 
in financial and business news (CNBC, CNNfn, Bloomberg 
TV...), ordinary newspapers dedicate more and more 
pages to the Finance section, business magazines 
increase their market share... (Shiller, 2000). What is 
also noticeable is the tendency of most amateur investors 
to follow the advices and opinions by ‘renowned gurus’ 
in business magazines and other specialized media, 
as well as the interest they demonstrate for technical 
analysis, despite the fact that this technique has a 
diminishing level of recognition within the academics. 
The attractiveness of technical analysis among amateur 
investors might be due to the fact that it offers 
investment rules that are largely subjective and require 
little financial knowledge.
Investing through professional intermediation, on the 
other hand, represents a large stake of the industry’s 
revenue with a growing volume of  assets  under 
management, as it can be inferred from the evolution of 
the world’s high income population.14 This group doubled in 
just ten years; indeed, its figure increased from 5.2 million 
investors in 1997 to 10.1 million in 2007 and, despite the 
current financial crisis, it reached to the record figure of 
10.9 million in 2010 (Capgemini & Merrill Lynch, 2008, 
2011). The majority of these investors manage their assets 
through private banking services; services that are usually 
more profitable to the companies that provide them than 
the traditionally asset management services, because they 
require advice and personalized management.15 Indeed, 
even with the global crisis and the economic uncertainty, 
reports by Credit Suisse (Credit Suisse, 2007, 2011) or 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2011) 
predict that private banking will maintain a high growth 
potential and provide a high rate of return in the following 
years.
Why are high‑net‑worth‑individuals (HNWIs) willing to pay 
for advising? We should not be naive here to believe that 
professional managers and financial advisors are free of the 
biases that pervade most investor’s decisions: there is plenty 
of empirical research showing that financial experts do 
14. This population is defined as people that are more than a 
million dollars invested in financial assets.
15. As an example we may analyze Credit Suisse, one of the global 
leaders of the private banking sector. Its annual reports of 2007 and 
2010 show a growing tendency of net revenues from the private 
banking area (9.58 billion Swiss francs and 11.63 billion, 
respectively), whereas the institutional asset management division 
of Credit Suisse generated 2.59 and 2.33 billion Swiss francs, 
respectively. The higher profitability of the private banking area 
becomes clear when we see that, in year 2010, assets under 
management were just more than double than in the asset 
management division: 932.9 billion Swiss francs (1.25% margin) vs 
425.8 billion (0.55% margin).
exhibit the same ‘social behaviour’ as individual investors.16 
However, these experts have far more financial knowledge 
than the average amateur investor, at least enough to be 
aware of the enormous difficulty to systematically beat 
the market. That is why there is a growing feeling in the 
industry that being successful in financial advising services 
largely depends on knowing your customers well and 
maintaining a stable and reliable relationship with them, 
in order to provide them at any time with the investment 
guidelines that are in accordance with their risk profile, 
their life horizon, their goals and restrictions.
Hens and Bachmann17 (2008), for example, make a series 
of recommendations to private banking professionals in 
order to help them taking into account that “each customer 
is unique” when providing consultancy services. This way, 
a financial advisor’s main goal must be to offer investment 
advice through a close relationship with the customer, in a 
way that enables them to achieve their financial goals while 
avoiding, as much as possible, the classic psychological traps 
we fall into when making decisions under risk or uncertainty. 
A tailor-made advisory service must always best suit the 
risk ability, the risk preference, and — this is particularly 
relevant — the risk awareness of the client. Indeed, Hens 
and Bachmann (2008) point out that while traditional 
finance — with its cornerstones of mean‑variance analysis, 
efficient market hypothesis, and derivative pricing — has 
provided good models to understand the market, it is not 
appropriate for understanding clients. (Preface, p. xxi.)
Two reasons are provided by the authors to support 
their view. Firstly, behavioural biases of clients are not 
included in the financial models: this makes advisors unable 
to understand their customers’ reactions in face of the 
investment outcomes. Secondly, traditional finance uses a 
simplified vision of risk, measured by the variance. This does 
not fit with the interpretation most investors make about 
it. At this point a crucial concept appears; namely, the one 
that determines the investors’ ability to fully understand 
the consequences of their investment decisions and the 
professional advisors’ capacity to provide investment 
recommendations that are suitable to each customer: risk. 
Do we really understand the true meaning of the word ‘risk’? 
We all understand the difference between earning 5% or 10% 
out of our investments, and we understand we all prefer the 
latter, too; but this is a tricky preference if analyzed when 
the outcome of our decisions is known. It is ex‑ante when an 
investor has to choose among several options, and where the 
outcomes of such alternatives depend on different states of 
nature with their corresponding probabilities.
Investing in financial assets may be tough and confusing 
for many amateur investors. We have no ‘sure rules’ to 
tell us what the result of our investments will be, only 
16. A behaviour exists known as herding, which suggests professio-
nal investors tend to imitate each other when making decisions 
and/or providing investment recommendations. This behaviour 
would be inefficient on a market basis but, according to Scharfstein 
and Stein (1990), it would be rational from the point of view of a 
professional manager worried about their reputation in the labour 
market.
17. Thorsten Hens and Kremena Bachman are professors at the 
Swiss Banking Institute of the University of Zürich and experts in 
Behavioural Finance and Wealth Management.
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probabilities. Furthermore, those probabilities are not only 
difficult to understand for neophytes in finance, but they 
are also sometimes loaded with subjectivity. What is, for 
example, the probability of the Euro depreciating by 5% 
against the U.S. dollar in the next few months? And what 
is the probability for the price of a barrel of crude oil to 
rise by 20%? And for the average price of the real estate 
market in Spain to fall by 10%?... Allocating probabilities 
to events like these might even be tautological: we would 
use the probabilities of occurrence we think they might be 
(subjective probabilities).18 In Medicine, Biology, Physics and 
Natural sciences in general we use (objective) probabilities 
based on the survival rate of a disease, the ability of a 
virus to reproduce..., i.e. based on previous experiments 
made under similar characteristics. However, in Finance we 
cannot do that; generally we face unique events with no 
possibility of an experimental test.19 This makes financial 
knowledge particularly ambiguous and opaque, both to 
amateur investors and experts. And for financial advisors it 
entails a puzzle that is hard to solve, because they seem 
to be doomed to satisfy the classic demand of their clients 
(obtaining high returns20) without being sure that their 
customers are indeed aware of the risks assumed.
3.2. Risk awareness
Let us assume the following situation (Situation I). Imagine 
1,000 euros on the left hand of a third person, and 
1,000 euros on his or her right hand: would you consider 
them identical? Or would you have any preference for the 
1,000 euros on his or her left hand instead of those in his or 
her right hand (or vice versa)? Probably not: one thousand 
euros are one thousand euros anyway, right? Well, we will 
see that sometimes, for many of us, it is not.
Let us now consider the following alternative situation 
(Situation II). Imagine the day of your birthday is coming 
and a relative of yours wants to give you a present. What 
would you prefer: a bike, or that same bike plus 100 euros? 
All of us would prefer the second option, correct? That 
means ‘more is better’ (monotonicity of preferences) in the 
sense that we all prefer more to less, particularly if we are 
talking about money. However, we shall also see that, under 
18. The debate between objective probabilities (frequentist 
distributions) and subjective probabilities (bayesian distributions) 
is a classic in Statistics. It is easy to see then why understanding 
probabilities is hard for a layman, when the debate continues 
among experts! If we assume objective probabilities, we are 
suggesting randomness and probabilities do exist in fact in Nature. 
Nevertheless, many statisticians and philosophers reject this point 
of view: they instead interpret probabilities as a measure of our 
lack of knowledge about all the conditions and variables that might 
affect the outcome of an event or a set of circumstances, and for 
such reason we call it a ‘random event’. Probabilities, interpreted 
like this, would be subjective: a measure of our beliefs about the 
possible outcomes of a given event.
19. As Paul Samuelson (1994) interestingly pointed out, “we only 
have one history of capitalism”, and we should never make 
definitive conclusions out of “a sample of size one”. In brief, we 
should be aware that our knowledge about financial markets is, and 
always will be, limited.
20. Something that necessarily requires to assume a higher level 
of risk.
specific conditions, the vast majority of us would let those 
100 euros go.
There is much to say about our behaviour towards risk, 
and even more about whether people are fully aware of 
it (a concept known as ‘risk awareness’) or not. In what 
follows we present some results about risk perception 
that come from a test to 96 undergraduate students at the 
University of A Coruña. The test was performed as part of 
the subject Financial Management and included a broader 
list of questions. We have used some of these questions and 
the tests results to illustrate our conclusions in this paper.
Standard finance’s rationality means two things (Barberis 
and Thaler, 2003). First, agents are bayesian, meaning they 
update their beliefs when new information comes to the 
market according to the well-know Bayes’ law, a formula for 
calculating the probability that something (called A) is true 
or will be true, given that a certain set of circumstances 
(called B) is true, as follows
Prob(A|B) = 
Prob(B|A) · Prob(A)
Prob(B)
 (1)
Second, agents’ choices are consistent with the notion of 
a subjective expected utility. The expected utility theory 
(EUT) − the generally accepted normative model of rational 
choice under risk − is derived from a set of axioms everyone 
should follow to make rational decisions; namely, that 
preferences21 should be complete, transitive, continuous, 
and satisfy the independence axiom. Decision making 
under risk can be viewed as a choice between prospects 
or gambles, where the concept of stochastic dominance 
becomes determinant. We are not going to deal with this 
concept but (shall) only say that risk aversion plays a key 
21. A preference is a binary relationship on a choice set Χ. Given 
two alternatives, x,y ∈ Χ, a preference x * y means that alternative 
x is at least as good as alternative y, x > y means x is strictly 
preferred, and finally x , y means both alternatives are equally 
good. A preference relation is complete if for all alternatives in the 
choice set Χ the individual has a well‑defined preference. Besides, 
it is transitive if for all x,y,z ∈ Χ, such as x * y and y * z, then x * z 
holds. Finally, preferences are representative of a rational choice, 
and a utility function exists and describes those preferences, if the 
preference relation on Χ is continuous, that is, if for all lotteries 
such as x,y,z, satisfying x > y * z, there exists a number a, a ∈ (0,1), 
and such that ax + (1 − a)z > y. In words, preferences neither exhibit 
erratic behaviour like sudden jumps caused by minor changes in 
data, nor there are alternatives infinitely better or worse than 
others that ‘poisons’ any compound alternative in which it is 
included. Completeness, transitivity and continuousness ensure a 
preference relation can be assigned numerical values (a utility 
function) to the outcomes of different alternatives in order to 
compare them. Finally, independence axiom is satisfied if for all 
lotteries x,y,z (being a lottery a set of consequences and the 
probabilities of occurrence) and for all numbers a ∈ [0,1], we have 
x * y if and only if ax + (1 − a)z * ay + (1 − a)z, i.e. if one lottery is 
preferred to another, and we mix both with the same third one, 
then the preference ordering is independent of the particular third 
lottery used. Hence, if preferences, besides being complete, 
transitive and continuous, satisfy the independence axiom, they 
can be represented by an expected utility function, where the 
expected utility of a lottery is the sum of utilities derived from 
each of the consequences the lottery offers, weighted with their 
probabilities.
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role here: all risk‑averse agents that maximize expected 
utility prefer a lottery that dominates another in the 
second order stochastic dominance (SSD) sense.22 Modern 
Portfolio Theory (MPT), for example, assumes all investors 
are risk averse so they never choose a portfolio that has 
larger variance with the same mean return. The prevalence 
of risk aversion is the best known generalization regarding 
risky choices, and led theorists to propose that utility is a 
concave function of money (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) 
because risk aversion is equivalent to the concavity of the 
utility function.
How do we know whether people are risk averse or not? 
A simple way to infer the risk profile of an individual is to 
make them choose between a lottery and a certain payoff. 
The sure quantity that makes an individual indifferent 
between the lottery and the payoff is known as the certainty 
equivalent. If such level is below (above) the expected 
payoff of the gamble, then this individual is said to be 
risk-averse (risk-loving).23 In our test, students were asked 
to imagine they were participating in a TV contest where 
they had to choose one of the two following alternatives:
(a)  tossing a coin with 50% chance to win 100 euros and 50% 
chance to win nothing, or
(b) earning 20 euros for sure.
Well, most of them preferred the gamble defined in 
(a). Indeed, most people chose the lottery even the 
certain payoff was above the expected return of the game 
(50 euros).24 However, we should not draw a hasty 
conclusion here to believe this implies most people are 
risk-loving: what it actually means is that we were not 
talking about ‘big money’ yet. Indeed, when we asked them 
“imagine now the possible outcomes of the coin tossed are 
5,000 euros (50%) or nothing (50%), and the alternative is 
22. A lottery dominates another if the former yields a better 
outcome in any state of nature. SSD is a weaker condition than first 
order stochastic dominance (FSD): it holds whenever the area under 
one cumulative distribution is equal to, or larger than, that under 
the other cumulative distribution (Hadar & Russell, 1969, p. 27).
23. An alternative way to define risk aversion is that it measures 
the reluctance of a person to accept the lottery with the higher, but 
uncertain, payoff.
24. Most subjects in the test said they would require 60 to 80 eu-
ros to choose not to gamble.
a certain payoff of 1,000 euros”, some respondents that 
thought 20 euros were not enough to disesteem playing the 
lottery now preferred the sure option, with most people 
requiring a certain quantity below 2,500 euros in order not 
to gamble. This is illustrated in Figure 1.
This change in behaviour (being risk-loving for small 
quantities of prizes and risk‑averse when the bet is 
significant) is recognized in the two alternative measures 
of risk-aversion: the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk 
aversion (ARA) and the relative risk aversion (RRA). As is 
well known, the ARA is defined as
ARA(w) = − 
u″(w)
u′(w)′
 (2)
where w denotes wealth, and u ′(w) and u″(w) are, 
respectively, the first and second derivative of the 
(expected) utility function u(w).25 In turn, the RRA is 
obtained by multiplying ARA by wealth,
RRA(w) = − 
u″(w)
u′(w)′
 w (3)
and is a measure that has the advantage that is still a valid 
measure of risk aversion even if the utility function changes 
from risk-averse to risk-loving as wealth changes (as we saw 
in the test). This way, if an agent has constant absolute risk 
aversion (CARA), the agent shall not increase a single euro 
invested in risky assets as his or her wealth increases. On 
the contrary, an agent having constant relative risk aversion 
(CRRA) would increase the amount invested in risky assets 
as his or her wealth increases, so as the share of wealth 
invested in risky assets remains constant.
Therefore, nothing surprising has happened in our test 
so far. However, the next few questions in the test offer 
evidence of what Prospect Theory came to highlight: 
in practice, individuals do not behave as the EUT 
25. As is well known, we can measure the degree of risk aversion 
by the curvature of the utility function. If the utility function is 
concave, the higher the curvature, the higher the risk aversion. We 
could use the second derivative for such purpose, but such measure 
would not be invariant under positive affine transformations of the 
utility function. The simplest way to solve that is to use 
the Arrow‑Pratt measure of ARA (Hens & Bachmann, 2008).
utility utility
Risk
Aversion
0 10 E(x) = 50 100 payoff
Risk
Loving
Risk
Aversion
0 1,000 E(x) = 2,500 5,000 payoff
Risk
Loving
Figure 1 Change in risk attitude.
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suggests,26 violating some of the axioms and hypothesis 
above. Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) is 
the best known and most accepted descriptive model of 
decision making under risk. When analyzing how people 
actually perceive risk and make decisions, Daniel Kahneman 
and Amos Tversky detected several anomalies with respect 
to the normative prescriptions of traditional Finance. Two 
of them are loss aversion and the reflection effect. Loss 
aversion means that investors assign more significance to 
losses than to gains of an equivalent value. It represents a 
challenge to the EUT, because if loss aversion is present, the 
basic property of EUT that two indifference curves never 
intersect, i.e. that indifference curves are ‘reversible’,27 no 
longer holds (Knetsch, 1989). Reflection effect, on the other 
hand, is the tendency to exhibit risk aversion when returns 
are positive, and risk seeking when facing the possibility of 
suffering losses.28
Students in our test where asked to choose between tossing 
the coin to win 4,000 euros (50%) or to lose 1,000 (50%), i.e. 
the lottery (−1,000, 0.5; 4,000, 0.5), or doing nothing so the 
(certain) payoff would be zero. The surprising result was 
that most students preferred not to gamble, even those that 
preferred a lottery as (0, 0.5; 5,000, 0.5) to a sure gain of 
1,000 euros.29 Why is it so surprising? Because both games 
are, indeed, financially identical, but they lead to different 
choices. The Figure 2 illustrates both choices. 
Please note we are not saying lottery A defined as (0, 0.5; 
5,000, 0.5) is identical to lottery B defined as (−1,000, 0.5; 
4,000, 0.5), obviously not. But choosing between lottery A 
or a certain payoff of 1,000 euros, and lottery B or nothing 
are (financially) identical choices. Then, why did many 
respondents change their views? Because, for most of us, it 
is not true that “one thousand euros are one thousand euros 
anyway” (recall the above mentioned Situation I). People feel 
26. “The modern theory of decision making under risk emerged 
from a logical analysis of games of chance rather than from a 
psychological analysis of risk and value. The theory was conceived 
as a normative model of an idealized decision maker, not as a 
description of the behavior of real people”. See Tversky and 
Kahneman (1986, p. S251).
27. That is, if an individual owns x and is indifferent between 
keep ing it and trading it for y, then when owning y the individual 
should be indifferent about trading it for x. See Kahneman et al. 
(1991).
28. A behaviour already noted by Harry Markowitz (1952).
29. See Figure 1 and the discussion therein.
the certain payoff of one thousand euros in the first choice as 
‘pennies from heaven’: if they choose gambling and lose them, 
that won’t be painful. On the contrary, if in the second choice 
they choose gambling and lose one thousand euros, “that’s MY 
money!” they say. Indeed, when asked why they viewed those 
1,000 euros differently, one student said “because I earned 
those thousand euros by the sweat of my brow!”, while other 
said she went to the contest to win some money or nothing if 
she had no luck, but “if you go to the contest and lose money, 
your friends will think you are a fool!”.
Finally, students were also asked which options they 
would choose if they had the possibility to choose between
(c) win 2,400 euros for sure, or
(d)  playing a lottery with 25% probabil ity to win 
10,000 euros and 75% of earning zero,
... and then between...
(e) a sure loss of 7,500 euros, or
(f)  playing a lottery with 75% probability to lose 
10,000 euros and 25% of losing zero.
92.7% of students (89 respondents out of 96) chose 
alternatives (c) and (f). This implies a reflection effect as 
Kahneman and Tversky predicted: students showed risk 
aversion for positive returns (they preferred a certain payoff 
of 2,400 euros to the higher expected payoff of the gamble, 
2,500 euros), and risk loving in the negative domain. 
The above implies two relevant results. On one hand, 
people exhibit aversion to a sure loss (also known as ‘risk 
seeking’ for negative domains): when the alternative 
is a sure loss, people prefer to gamble even if chances 
are really low! We made our students notice that, in the 
previous question, most of them considered it painful 
the possibility of losing 1,000 euros of ‘their own money’ 
with 50% probability, but now they were willing to bet 75% 
probability of losing 2,500 euros more... and they just did 
not care! On the other hand, we may see the combination 
of both choices led 93% of people in our sample to prefer 
‘the bike’ instead of ‘the same bike plus 100 euros’ (recall 
Situation II). Indeed, the combination of options (c) and (f) 
is equivalent to play a lottery with
•  75% probability to lose 7,600 euros, and
•  25% probability to win 2,400 euros,
Figure 2 Lottery A (left) and lottery B (right).
utility utility
Risk
Aversion
0 1,000 E(x) = 2,500 5,000 payoff
Risk
Loving
Risk
Aversion
–1,000 0 E(x) = 1,500 4,000 payoff
Risk
Loving
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whereas had they chosen options (d) and (e) that would 
have been equivalent to play a lottery with:
•  75% probability to lose 7,500 euros, and
•  25% probability to win 2,500 euros.
Clearly (d) and (e) should be preferred to (c) and (f) when 
it represents the same lottery plus 100 euros, but at least 
93% of the respondents30 did not see it. 
There are much more anomalies identified by the 
Behavioural Finance, but just not enough space in this 
paper. We have summarized some of them: we are not good 
at probabilities, we avoid ambiguity and dislike doubt, we 
constantly seek to confirm evidence while ignoring counter 
facts (often leading us to make overconfident decisions), 
we exhibit preference reversals in inter-temporal decision 
making,31 and we fail to account for events that are 
unfamiliar to us, while we tend to exaggerate the likelihood 
of rare outcomes when we do consider them! In fact, 
given that individuals are known to exhibit this tendency 
to overweight the mere possibility of something to happen 
— no matter how small the probability of occurrence is32 — 
it would explain why experts (engineers, economists...) 
tend to disregard the probability of rare events to occur. 
Examples are: Japan could not suffer a tsunami like the 
recent one in 2011, nuclear power plants are designed to 
be safe against all possible contingencies, the Twin Towers 
of New York could not collapse, the Titanic was unsinkable…
4. Which features do investors share according 
to the structure of their portfolios?
If there is a bias that could be observed among investors 
of any kind it is clearly the tendency to invest in domestic 
securities, a phenomenon known as home (or local) bias.33 
Capgemini and Merrill Lynch (2011) provide empirical 
evidence of this bias. If we analyze data from the four 
global macroeconomic regions (US, Europe, Asia and South 
America) we can see that, in year 2010, 76% of the wealth of 
US HNWIs was invested in domestic securities, for European 
investors it represented 56%, 57% for Asian investors, and 
47% for South American investors. (See Figure 3.)
30. We say ‘at least’ because of the seven people that did not 
choose (c) and (f) only two persons did choose (d) and (e).
31. Rational evaluation of future decisions requires time consis-
tency, but often when people say they prefer 110 dollars within 
31 days to 100 dollars within 30 days, they then change to 100 do-
llars today better than 110 dollars tomorrow. That represents a pre-
ference reversal, inconsistent with inter-temporal rational expec-
tations.
32. Hens and Bachmann (2008) explain that Prospect Theory 
emerged indeed to explain why nuclear energy is largely repudiated 
by the public. Kahneman and Tversky received a grant from the US 
government to analyze why people protested so much against it, 
and their results showed the public did not buy the argument that 
nuclear power was safe, because the mere possibility of a nuclear 
catastrophe to occur, even though its probability is very small, 
made them see it as a risky business. Hence, over‑weighting small 
probabilities became one of the cornerstones of Prospect Theory.
33. Home bias for securities of the same country as the investor, 
and local bias for local securities.
We can see this bias affects not only individual investors, 
but institutional investors too: the exposure of European 
banks to sovereign debt securities of the so-called 
European peripheral countries is a good example. According 
to the EBA34 stress tests, 84% of Spanish government debt is 
held by Spanish banks,35 67% of Greek debt was purchased 
by Greek banks, 61% of Irish debt by Irish banks and 63% of 
Portuguese government securities by Portuguese financial 
institutions (European Banking Authority, 2011). 
On the contrary, according to Banco de España, Spanish 
banks had a tiny percentage of their assets invested in 
other peripheral government securities. To illustrate, 
0.01% in Greek debt, negligible in Irish securities, 0.16% 
in Portuguese debt... (See Figure 4). Is this diversification? 
Obviously not.
A classical rationality for home and local bias is 
familiarity: people simply prefer to invest in the familiar 
− see Huberman’s (2001) empirical evidence from the 
geographical distribution of shareholders of seven ‘regional 
bell operating companies’ in the U.S. — so familiarity 
becomes a key determinant of investors’ behaviour (see 
empirical evidence in Ackert et al., 2005). Indeed, this 
familiarity bias would be related to the evidence that people 
fear change and the unknown (Cao et al., 2011). However, 
in our opinion this behaviour could be a valid shortcut for 
amateur investors but not for institutional investors, who 
have plenty of resources available and easy access to 
information. The exposure of European banks to sovereign 
debt securities, as well as any other evidence of home 
bias in institutional investing across Europe, might on the 
contrary be interpreted as a proof of a lack of integration of 
the European financial system.
Another feature that investors share, as we saw in section 
3, is loss aversion. Prospect Theory replaces the utility 
function by a value function defined over changes in wealth, 
v(Dx), and which has three relevant properties: (i) It is 
defined over gains and losses with respect to a reference 
point, (ii) it is (strictly) concave for gains but convex for 
losses, and (iii) it is flatter for gains than for losses. This is 
illustrated in Figure 5.
The third property of the value function determines loss 
aversion: investors losing 1,000 euros in their portfolios will 
require gaining more than 1,000 euros as compensation. 
Indeed, Tversky and Kahneman (1991) provide empirical 
findings suggesting losses are weighted about twice as much 
as gains, though the debate is still open.36 Furthermore, 
since investors exhibit a tendency to over-weight the 
probability of extreme events, they overestimate the 
probability of suffering a loss. This psychological effect 
should be taken into account in risk management (Hens 
& Bachmann, 2008), and a properly diversified portfolio 
should be designed to accommodate losses. This is because 
losses that are anticipated are indeed psychologically easier 
to cope with (Chancellor, 2012).
34. European Banking Authority.
35. To illustrate, BBVA (with 55.7 billion euros) and Banco 
Santander (with 46.0 billion euros) were the larger holders of 
Spanish government debt on December 31, 2010 (see European 
Banking Authority, 2011). 
36. See McGraw et al. (2010) for a discussion on this topic.
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Most investors also tend to analyze their investment on a 
security basis, ignoring the most basic precepts of MPT about 
diversification. That is why, beyond just selling financial 
products, a good financial advisor should be concerned 
about providing his or her clients with financial knowledge 
on essential topics as the benefits of diversification. 
Besides, and according to what we described in section 3, 
amateur investors are usually keen on fads, often generated 
by the financial industry itself or the media, and probably 
exacerbated by changes in fiscal rules (like the regulation of 
pension funds in Spain). Finally, given that not only amateur 
investors but professionals too − and sometimes with more 
intensity − exhibit the cognitive and emotional biases the 
behavioural finance describes, such as fear, greed, herd 
instinct,37 heuristics and framing biases, it is not surprising 
finding similar portfolios held by clients of a different kind 
and risk profile, neglecting the most basic investment rules.
We should not blame it solely on professionals. Individual 
investors should also look for advice and should improve 
their financial knowledge, but most of them seem to be 
interested only in trying to get the highest possible return 
out of their investments. An interesting observation is the 
concept of a ‘psychological call option’, introduced by 
Hens and Bachmann (2008): many investors hire advising 
services not (just) to get some advice, but to attribute a 
favourable outcome to his or her skills when the investment 
decision turns out well, whereas if it turns badly he or she 
has someone to blame... True or not, it is easy to observe 
investors are more concerned with quickly achieving their 
return expectations, whereas financial institutions are 
more worried about fulfilling those expectations as soon as 
possible; a short‑termism that benefits neither investors nor 
institutions.
5. Summary: What models predict and what 
investors do
The basics of normative financial models suggest the 
existence of markets where the information available 
is fully reflected by the pricing mechanism, so investors 
cannot systematically beat the market (EMH), where the 
benefits of diversification are essential to invest (MPT), 
where systematic risk and expected return are intertwined 
(CAPM), and where markets in equilibrium can offer no 
arbitrage opportunities (APT and derivatives pricing).
Traditional investment rules by the financial industry, on 
the other hand, include both recommendations that agree 
with the EMH (buy‑and‑hold strategies, index funds, etc.) 
and those that contradict the EMH to some extent (technical 
analysis, fundamental analysis). Even some theories 
opposed to EMH, like the Behavioural Finance, support 
some of its conclusions when referred to the impossibility 
for investors to systematically beat the market. A classic 
in the financial industry is the investor life cycle model: 
investment recommendations should be in accordance not 
only with the investor’s risk profile, but with his or her 
life expectancy, goals and financial restrictions. Finally, 
37. See Shleifer (2000) regarding herding among traders, market 
analysts, etc.
investments should be implemented in three stages: asset 
allocation, asset choice and market timing.
Opposed to those rules, empirical evidence suggests 
amateur investors have a strong tendency to follow 
fads, rumours, recommendations by financial ‘gurus’ 
and magazines, and to base their analysis, at least some 
individual investors, on technical analysis and chartism (a 
technique with a low reputation among academics). Those 
factors would explain why their investment portfolios are 
often poorly diversified, and exposed to fads, changes in 
Figure 4 Percentage of public debt held by national banks in 
some European countries.
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fiscal rules, interests of the financial industry, and to the 
emotional and cognitive biases of the investor themselves.
Passive investors who hire professional services (private 
banking in particular) to help them manage their savings 
have an additional support to mitigate the biases and 
mistakes described for amateur investors. However, this 
assertion should be qualified. On one hand, professional 
investors − and even institutions − exhibit some of the 
biases observed in amateur investors.38 On the other hand, 
for the support of financial advisors to be helpful it is 
essential to develop a relationship of mutual trust between 
clients and advisors. Such a relationship of trust should rely 
on three pillars: first, the ability of the financial advisor to 
instruct customers in concepts like probability, risk-return 
tradeoff, decision-making under risk (prospect theory), 
risk awareness...; second, they must know in advance the 
risk ability, the risk preference, and the risk awareness of 
their client; and third, the customer must understand (and 
perceive) the advisor really looks after their interests 
and not (only) for the interests of their financial institution.
To illustrate decision making under risk by investors we 
provided some empirical results of a test to undergraduate 
students designed to highlight how framing (the way the 
setting for a decision task is framed) influences people’s 
decisions, which is a critical aspect of Kahneman and 
Tversky’s (1979) Prospect Theory. Besides, some insight 
on the other branches of Behavioural Finance is also 
provided: how heuristics and biases (e.g., overconfidence, 
confirmation bias, etc.) could affect investors’ behaviour, 
and henceforth how market anomalies (e.g., home bias) 
could be identified. Finally, Hens and Bachmann (2008) 
provided a first insight on how to integrate the foundations 
of Behavioural Finance in the consultancy services of private 
banking, a line of thought we tackle in this paper and which 
we consider interesting for future research. Following 
this, an open question is how to reconcile normative and 
positive theories: should normative models account for the 
empirical behaviour observed of agents, or should our better 
understanding of the most common biases people exhibit 
help us introduce some sort of ‘debiasing’ techniques? For 
those who would choose the second option... don’t you 
think we could make the same mistakes, even if we are 
aware of them? How many of us would bet for tails after a 
coin tossed resulted in seven heads in a row, even though 
we are aware that the probability of both head and tails is 
still 50%?
6. Conclusions
Although our knowledge about financial markets is − 
and always will be − incomplete, and the models we 
use imperfect, their recommendations should serve as 
guidelines for us. However, many investors tend to ignore 
the most basic investment rules. Besides, given uncertainty 
is inherent to financial markets, most investors have 
difficulties to understand the risks they are assuming or 
they are required to assume in order to get their expected 
38 Recall the home bias in sovereign debt portfolios by European 
banks (see Figure 4).
returns, particularly those amateur investors not used to 
work with probabilities.
Hence, one important role of financial professionals 
should be helping their customers understand the basic 
precepts in finance: for example, that both their risk 
appetite and risk awareness should play an essential role 
when constructing their portfolios. However, this puts 
customers in an uneven relationship with the financial 
industry: advisors could behave for their own benefit’s sake 
instead of their customers’. That is one of the reasons why 
the European Union set MiFID, the harmonized regulation 
for investment services, in 2004. In this context, working 
to increase the financial knowledge of the people and to 
establish long-term and trusty relationships between clients 
and financial managers should benefit both investors and 
the financial industry as well.
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